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SAVING OKLAHOMA’S “SAVE OUR STATE” AMENDMENT:
SHARIA LAW IN THE WEST AND SUGGESTIONS TO
PROTECT SIMILAR STATE LEGISLATION FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK
Steven M. Rosato*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an increasing number of states have introduced
bills and constitutional amendments seeking to ban or limit the use
1
of Sharia or international law in state court decisions. While the
2
overwhelming majority of such bills have failed to achieve passage,
Oklahoma succeeded in 2010 in passing a state constitutional
amendment popularly known as the “Save Our State” Amendment
(the “Amendment”), which sought to ban state courts from
considering international law in general and Sharia Law in
3
particular. The Amendment passed decisively by referendum on
4
November 2, 2010, with voter approval over 70%.
Shortly thereafter, Muneer Awad (a Muslim resident of
Oklahoma) challenged the Amendment in U.S. District Court on the
grounds that it violated both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Awad obtained a
5
preliminary injunction to prevent certification of the election result.

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Hamilton
College. The author would like to thank Professor Ronald Riccio for his valuable
input on this Comment. In addition, I would like to thank my fellow Editors who
worked so hard to prepare this Comment for publication. Finally, a special thanks to
Dr. Irfan al-Alawi and the Center for Islamic Pluralism, without whose work this
Comment would be incomplete.
1
See Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia
Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 370 (2012).
2
Id. at 371.
3
H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf.
4
Oklahoma “Sharia Law Amendment”, State Question 755 (2010),
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/
index.php/Oklahoma_%22Sharia_Law_Amendment%22,_State_Question_755
(2010).
5
See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d
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The State appealed the District Court’s ruling to the Tenth Circuit,
which affirmed the injunction, holding that the Amendment violated
the Establishment Clause, but the court declined to reach the
question of whether the Amendment also violated the Free Exercise
6
Clause. While the Tenth Circuit’s result may be correct in this
particular case, it is important to understand the complex reasons
why state legislatures across the United States continue to propose
measures very similar to the “Save Our State” Amendment. This
perceived backlash against Sharia should not merely be dismissed as
an “Islamophobic” reaction of close-minded individuals in the wake
of 9/11; to do so would ignore real and ominous developments in
Western countries with significant Muslim populations.
Sharia is generally defined as “[t]he body of Islamic religious law
7
applicable to police, banking, business, contracts, and social issues.”
While this general definition introduces the very basic concept that
Sharia seeks to govern a wide array of societal and economic
interactions, it fails to capture the distinctions made among various
8
Islamic countries and sects. The nuances of Sharia will be developed
more fully below, but the fact that there exist differing
interpretations of Sharia is introduced here simply to emphasize that
there is not a single, definitive interpretation of Sharia in the Muslim
world.
Muslim practitioners in Islamic countries have developed Sharia
9
law along two separate tracks. On one track is the traditional
conception of Sharia as a personal guide for believers; that is, the
application of Sharia is “limited to religious observance by Muslims,
10
and elements of family law.” This particular form of Sharia, which
deals mostly with personal behavior, is purely voluntary among

1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
6
See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
7
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1501 (9th ed. 2011).
8
For example, there exist five distinct schools of thought on the interpretation
of Sharia: the Hanafi school (the most liberal and most influential), the Maliki
school, the Shafi’i school, the Hanbali school, and the Jafari school (practiced by the
majority of Shia Muslims). Toni Johnson & Lauren Vriens, Islam: Governing Under
Sharia,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(Jan.
9,
2013),
http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034.
9
DR. IRFAN AL-ALAWI ET AL., CTR. FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM, A GUIDE TO SHARIAH
LAW AND ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY IN WESTERN EUROPE 2007-2009 5 (2009), available at
http://www.islamicpluralism.org/documents/shariah-law-islamist-ideology-westerneurope.pdf [hereinafter A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW].
10
Id.
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adherents in Western countries.
Moreover, the traditional
conception of Sharia directs followers living in Western countries to
“obey the laws and customs of the land to which they move, and to set
12
a good example to their non-Muslim neighbors.” Indeed, prior to
the rise of more radical forms of Sharia in the twentieth century,
Islamic adherents in Western countries rarely challenged the validity
13
of Western legal systems as applied to them.
Thus, traditional
Sharia generally has had no impact on Western legal systems,
although some of its applications can conflict with the Western legal
14
tradition in certain areas such as family law. For example, it is far
more common in the sensitive area of family law for Muslims to
“decline Western marriage, or be prevented by Western law . . . from
15
turning to Western courts regarding divorce and inheritance.” This
apparent clash notwithstanding, the traditional conception of Sharia
does not typically conflict with the legal systems of Western countries
because it does not advocate that adherents should flout the laws of
16
the non-Muslim countries in which they reside.
On the other track is the radical, or Islamist, conception of
17
Sharia, which “holds that the West is an area of unbelief and that
Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey Western laws but must
18
establish their own Islamic legal standard.” Gaining more support
in recent years among both Muslims and non-Muslims in Western
countries is the idea—originated in Islamist circles—of “parallel
Sharia,” which states that Muslims in non-Muslim countries should be
permitted to operate a legal system in parallel with the secular legal
19
system of the Western country in which they reside. While some
“Islamophobes” in Western countries claim that they will eventually
be forced to adhere to Sharia, this worry seems misplaced and
unwarranted. Rather, the greater emphasis should be placed on the
specter of a legal system that forces a particular religious group to
adhere to the tenets of religious law with no possibility of
20
intervention or adjudication by the secular courts.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 7–8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
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The concept of “parallel Sharia” falls somewhere in between the
traditional conception of Sharia, which holds that Muslims should
obey the laws of non-Muslim countries while still adhering to the
personal tenets of Islam, and the radical conception of Sharia, which
holds that Muslims in non-Muslim countries should not feel
21
compelled to obey the commands of the secular legal system.
“Parallel Sharia” calls for the establishment of a separate legal system
in non-Muslim countries based on the laws of the Muslim faith and
22
enforced by the non-Muslim secular governments themselves. It must be
noted, however, that a “parallel Sharia” system would not necessarily
include those radical elements supported by some adherents of the
23
Islamist conception. Nevertheless, there is always the danger that
24
radical elements of Sharia could be introduced into such a system.
Indeed, the idea of a parallel system of justice originated in radical
25
circles. Various scholars, including some with radical beliefs, have
euphemistically referred to “parallel Sharia” as “fiqh . . . for
minorities,” or “a body of opinion derived from Shariah doctrine to
26
govern the lives of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim lands.” These
euphemisms seemingly serve to give off the appearance that the
supporters of parallel Sharia merely seek a “reasonable
accommodation” of their religion, when in fact the true goal of
“parallel Sharia” is to bring Muslim minorities under an entirely
separate legal system administered by religious authorities and
27
enforced by Western governments.
Many Western countries have already adopted a system of
28
“reasonable accommodation” of differing religious views.
In the
United States, for example, employment regulations promulgated in
accordance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically define
“reasonable accommodation” and provide direction as to the manner
in which employers falling within the purview of the Act should
29
accommodate the religious views of their employees. “Reasonable
accommodation” is certainly an idea ingrained in our constitutional
system and is clearly in line with the First Amendment’s command
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 17.
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2012).
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that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
30
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” The concept
of a parallel system of justice for a religious minority, however, would
seem to exceed that constitutional command and foster isolation and
31
separation of the minority from the rest of society.
It seems
axiomatic that the Establishment Clause would be violated by a
system of law that treats individuals differently solely on the basis of
the religion that they practice.
Sharia law has been introduced to varying degrees in some of
the most influential countries in Europe, including Great Britain,
32
Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Spain.
Great Britain in
particular has seen a dramatic increase in Islamic radicalism in
conjunction with louder calls for the establishment of “parallel
Sharia” within its borders; in fact, the British government sanctioned
33
the creation of approximately eighty Sharia courts. While all of
these countries have relatively small Muslim populations—Britain’s
Muslim population, for example, accounts for approximately 4.8% of
the total population—there has been increasing focus on compliance
34
with the tenets of Sharia in these countries. In addition, various
statistics point to increasing radicalization of Muslim youth in
35
Western countries such as Great Britain.
This Comment will examine both the constitutionality of state
statutes or constitutional amendments that seek to ban the
consideration of Sharia law in judicial decision-making, and potential
alternative forms of legislation that might achieve the same goal of
separation of church and state that state constitutional amendments
like the “Save Our State” Amendment seek to achieve. Part II of this
Comment will provide background on Oklahoma’s “Save Our State”
Amendment, along with an analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Awad v. Ziriax. In order to further examine the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis and frame the constitutional discussion of alternatives to the

30

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 17–19.
32
See generally id. at 23–25.
33
Raheel Raza, The Rise of Sharia in the West, INT’L HUMANIST AND ETHICAL UNION
(Mar. 15, 2012, 7:21 PM), http://iheu.org/rise-sharia-west.
34
Id.
35
Id.; Douglas Murray, It’s Official: Muslim Population of Britain Doubles,
INSTITUTE
(Dec.
21,
2012,
4:30
AM),
GATESTONE
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3511/britain-muslim-population-doubles;
see
British Muslims Poll: Key Points, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2007, 1:04 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6309983.stm.
31
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“Save Our State” Amendment to be offered in Part V, Part III will
examine current Supreme Court jurisprudence of both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, which sets forth
the parameters in which state legislation on religious issues must
operate. Next, Part IV will provide an in-depth background on Sharia
law and its influence in various Western countries, ultimately arguing
that the increasing influence of Sharia law in Western countries and
calls for parallel systems of Sharia have been driving forces behind
the proposal of apparently anti-Sharia legislation in state legislatures
across the United States. Returning to the “Save Our State”
Amendment and similar state legislative initiatives, Part V will begin
with a discussion of the principles of federalism and argue that states
should be granted significant autonomy to craft rules of decision for
their courts. This Part will then go on to analyze various possible
state statutes and constitutional amendments that seek to limit
consideration of religious law in the secular courts and determine
whether each alternative would pass constitutional muster under
either Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause analysis. Finally,
Part VI will conclude by stating that regardless of one’s views on the
advisability of state constitutional amendments or statutes seeking to
ban consideration of religious doctrine in state court, so long as those
amendments or statutes do not run afoul of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment, states should be free to craft rules of decision
for their courts if they deem it to be of sufficient necessity to do so.
II. OKLAHOMA’S “SAVE OUR STATE” AMENDMENT AND AN ANALYSIS OF
THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN AWAD V. ZIRIAX
A. The “Save Our State” Amendment
The Oklahoma House of Representatives originally introduced
the “Save Our State” Amendment as a House Joint Resolution on
36
January 11, 2010. The stated purpose of the resolution was to “make
37
courts rely on federal and state laws when deciding cases.”
An
Oklahoma House News Release provides a glimpse into the thinking
of Oklahoma politicians as to the reasons why the Amendment was
necessary. In the Release, Representative Rex Duncan said:
36

Okla. B. History, 2010 Reg. Sess. H.J. Res. 1056, available at
http://newlsb.lsb.state.ok.us/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HJR1056&Session=1000.
37
H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/200910%20INT/hres/HJR1056%20INT
.PDF.
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Oklahomans should not have to worry that their rights
could be undermined by foreign court rulings in countries
that do not have our respect for individual liberty and
justice for all. Unfortunately, some judges in other states
and on the federal bench have begun to cite international
law in their court decisions, creating the need for this
38
constitutional amendment.
Based on this quote, one could infer that Oklahoma politicians
were largely concerned with the possibility that the state’s judges
might attempt to rest their decisions on international law and sought
to prevent that from happening. Both the Oklahoma House and
Senate eventually passed the Joint Resolution almost unanimously on
39
May 18, 2010, and May 24, 2010, respectively.
The relevant text of the Amendment, as adopted by the
Oklahoma Legislature, is as follows:
The Courts . . . shall uphold and adhere to the law as
provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law,
the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated thereto, and
if necessary the law of another of the United States provided
the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making
judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal
precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before
the respective courts, including, but not limited to, cases of
40
first impression.
Thus, the language of the Amendment specifically mentioned
“Sharia Law” twice. Following revisions of the Ballot Question by the
Attorney General, the Amendment was put up for referendum as
State Question 755 to Oklahoma voters on November 2, 2010, and
41
just over 70% of voters approved it. The Attorney General, perhaps

38

Okla. H.R. News Release, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., April 20, 2010, available at
http://www.okhouse.gov/Media/News_Story.aspx?NewsID=3571.
39
Okla. H.R. Journal, 2010 Reg. Sess. No. 62, May, 18, 2010, available at
http://www.okhouse.gov/52LEG/okh02856.txt; Okla. S. Journal, 2010 Reg. Sess. No.
64, May 24, 2010, available at http://www.oksenate.gov/
legislation/votes/votes_2010/2010_votes.aspx.
40
H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (emphasis added),
available
at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/legislation/52nd/2010/2R/HJ
/1056.pdf.
41
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012).
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unwisely as the later discussion on Sharia will demonstrate, revised
the Ballot Question to state that “Sharia Law is Islamic Law. It is based
42
on two principal sources, the Koran and the teachings of Mohammed.” The
Tenth Circuit noted that “[w]ithout intervention, the proposed
43
amendment would likely have been certified on November 9, 2010.”
B. The Decision in Awad v. Ziriax
On November 4, 2010, Muneer Awad, a practicing Muslim and
the executive director of the Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), brought suit in U.S. District
Court against the Oklahoma Election Board seeking to enjoin the
44
board from certifying the Amendment’s election result. Mr. Awad
argued that the Amendment violated both the Establishment Clause
and Free Exercise Clause due to the fact that the Amendment
45
explicitly singled out Islam for negative treatment.
The district
court issued a temporary restraining order on November 9, 2010, and
46
on November 29, the court granted a preliminary injunction. The
Election Board then appealed the district court’s decision on
47
December 1, 2010.
The Tenth Circuit considered Mr. Awad’s argument that the
Amendment violated the Establishment Clause in the context of the
48
standard for granting a preliminary injunction. It is important to
note that the court declined to reach Mr. Awad’s Free Exercise
Clause claim because it found that his “Establishment Clause claim
provide[d] sufficient grounds to uphold the preliminary
49
injunction[.]”
The court first set out to determine whether it
should apply the Lemon test or the Larson test—the two primary
Establishment Clause tests—in the context of this case.
The Lemon test will be discussed in-depth in the Part III of this
42

Id.
Id. (citing Okla. State Board Election Rule § 230:35-3-91(c)).
44
Id. at 1118–19.
45
Id. at 1119.
46
Id.
47
Awad, 670 F.3d at 1119.
48
Id. at 1125 (quoting Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC,
562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009)) (stating that in order for the court to grant a
preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish four factors: (1) substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) denial would result in irreparable injury; (3)
the threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the
injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be adversely affected by the
granting of the injunction).
49
Id. at 1119.
43
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Comment, but for the purposes of this case it is sufficient to note
“that Lemon applies to ‘laws affording uniform benefit to all religions,
50
and not to provisions . . . that discriminate among religions.’” Thus,
the test would seem to apply only in instances where the law at issue
does not single out a religion for disparate treatment, which would,
of course, make it inapposite for application in Awad. The Larson test
will also be discussed in greater detail below, but the Tenth Circuit
noted that Larson applies when “a law discriminates among religions,”
and a law that does so will “survive only if it is ‘closely fitted to the
51
furtherance of any compelling interest asserted.’” In other words, if
a law discriminates against a particular religion, the traditional rubric
of strict scrutiny commonly used in Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause analysis applies.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Larson test applied, and rejected
the Election Board’s arguments that Larson was not good law in light
of the fact that it is rarely used or, in the alternative, was not
52
applicable to the facts of this case.
In response to the Election
Board’s first argument, the court stated that “Larson’s rare use likely
reflects that legislatures seldom pass laws that make ‘explicit and
deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations’ as
53
contemplated in Larson.”
As to the second argument, Judge
Matheson concluded that the Amendment clearly discriminated
54
against Islam. The Election Board argued that the Amendment only
named Sharia law as an example and that the law’s primary purpose
was to ban Oklahoma courts from considering any religious law in
55
their decisions.
Judge Matheson, however, pointed to the
Amendment’s plain language, which explicitly provided that state
court judges are forbidden from considering the law of any state that
includes Sharia law, “but does not prohibit Oklahoma courts from
upholding and adhering to laws of other states that include the laws
56
of any other religion.” The Election Board argued in the alternative
that the use of the word “culture” in the Amendment was meant to be
synonymous with “religion,” and therefore that the amendment

50

Id. at 1126 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982)) (emphasis in
original).
51
Id. at 1127 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 255).
52
Id.
53
Awad, 670 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 n.23).
54
Id. at 1128.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 1128–29.
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sought to ban consideration of all religious laws. Judge Matheson
rejected this argument as well, stating that even if that were the case,
the Amendment would still purportedly permit judges to consider
58
religious laws or precepts that are part of Oklahoma culture.
Finding that Larson’s strict scrutiny test applied, Judge Matheson
59
then went on to analyze the Amendment under the test. The first
prong of the strict scrutiny test requires that the State demonstrate a
60
In order to do so, the government must
compelling interest.
demonstrate a real, identifiable harm that it is seeking to rectify;
“overly general statements of abstract principles do not satisfy the
61
government’s burden to articulate a compelling interest.” Judge
Matheson found that the government failed to show a compelling
interest because it included only one sentence in its supplemental
brief on the issue, which simply stated that “Oklahoma certainly has a
compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma
62
courts.” The court found that the government did “not identify any
63
actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to solve.” Moreover,
Judge Matheson noted that the government failed to identify any
concrete example of a case in which an Oklahoma judge applied
Sharia or international law, “let alone that such applications or uses
64
had resulted in concrete problems in Oklahoma.” Therefore, the
court concluded that the government had not asserted a compelling
65
state interest. Even though the court’s finding on the compellinginterest prong of the test mooted the need to consider whether the
law was narrowly tailored (the second prong of the test), Judge
Matheson observed that “the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia
66
law is hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring.”
In the final analysis, it would appear that the Tenth Circuit was
correct in affirming the district court’s grant of the preliminary
injunction. Judge Matheson’s decision to apply the Larson test, rather
than the Lemon test, was well reasoned because the explicit singling
57

Id. at 1129.
Id.
59
Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1130.
62
Id. (quoting Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 16, Awad, 670 F.3d 1111 (No.
10-6273)).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130.
66
Id. at 1131.
58
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out of Sharia law rendered the “Save Our State” Amendment fatally
flawed. In light of that explicit discrimination, the court had no
67
With respect to Judge
choice but to apply the Larson test.
Matheson’s application of strict scrutiny, the analysis seems to be
accurate as to whether the government asserted a compelling
interest. It is difficult to argue that the single sentence included by
68
the government in its brief is sufficient to state a compelling
interest. In the abstract, the government’s interest in setting up the
69
rules of decision for its courts is certainly a compelling one, but the
government utterly failed to point to any concrete problem that it was
seeking to solve. The government could have, at the very least,
pointed to cases in other states’ courts or at the federal level that
used or considered religious law or the legal precepts of other
nations in rendering a decision. Therefore, it seems fairly clear that
the statute fails to pass constitutional muster under the Larson test.
III. SUPREME COURT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
For the purposes of ensuring a full and fair analysis of alternative
forms of state statutes or constitutional amendments that achieve the
same goals as the “Save Our State” Amendment, it is important to
flesh out the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the
realm of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
The alternatives to be proposed in Part V below might implicate one
or the other (or both), and each alternative will be analyzed within
the framework laid out in this Part.
A. The Establishment Clause
The Lemon Test, which is one of the most well-known tests used
by the Court when considering statutes that provide benefits to
religion and religious organizations, was set forth in the 1971 case of
70
Lemon v. Kurtzman.
The case involved challenges to statutes in
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania that provided state aid or benefits to
71
nonpublic schools, including ones that were religiously affiliated.
The Rhode Island statute provided salary supplementation to
nonpublic school teachers that taught secular subjects, while the
67
68
69
70
71

See id. at 1126–27.
Id. at 1130.
Id. (stating that “Oklahoma’s asserted interest is a valid state concern.”).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 606.

ROSATO (DO NOT DELETE)

670

4/2/2014 12:23 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:659

Pennsylvania statute provided for reimbursement of teachers’
salaries, textbooks, and other materials only for courses related to
72
secular subjects.
The test set forth by the Lemon Court consists of three separate
prongs: (1) the Court must consider whether the challenged statute
73
has a secular legislative purpose; (2) the statute’s “principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
74
religion”; and (3) “the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
75
government entanglement with religion.’” As to the Rhode Island
statute, the Court determined that because the government would
have to continually oversee the operations of subsidized teachers to
ensure that those teachers were not injecting their religious views
into the classroom, there was impermissible entanglement between
76
the government and these religiously affiliated schools. In the case
of the Pennsylvania statute, the Court similarly found that “the very
restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a
strictly non-ideological role give rise to entanglements between
77
church and state.”
Moreover, the fact that the statute involved
direct aid to religiously affiliated schools pointed to a finding of
78
excessive entanglement. Accordingly, the Court determined that
both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes were
unconstitutional because they violated the third prong of the test—
that is, they represented “excessive entanglement between
79
government and religion.”
In contrast to the Lemon test, the Larson test, as set forth in
Larson v. Valente, applies in cases in which a statute discriminates
80
among different religions. The case involved a Minnesota statute
that required religious organizations receiving less than fifty percent
of total contributions from members or related organizations to
register with the Minnesota Department of Commerce and file a
81
detailed annual disclosure. All other religious organizations were

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 606–07.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618–20.
Id. at 620–21.
Id. at 621.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982).
Id. at 230–31.
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exempt from the reporting and registration requirements.
The
Court began its analysis with an important observation: “The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
83
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”
From this general principle, the Court ultimately determined
that “when [the Court is] presented with a state law granting a
denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the
law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its
84
constitutionality.”
The Court did briefly discuss the Lemon test,
stating that the third prong—excessive entanglement—was most
directly implicated in the case for substantially similar reasons as
85
those presented in Lemon itself.
Ultimately, however, the Court
determined that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest, and hence that it failed to pass
86
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny analysis.
The Court
found the government’s asserted interest in rooting out fraud to be
87
unconvincing.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
While the Court has analyzed cases under the Free Exercise
Clause in various contexts, this subpart will focus on one particular
class of laws: neutral laws of general application. Neutral laws of
general application are those laws that do not expressly implicate any
religion and are intended to apply in any setting, regardless of one’s
88
religious views. The Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in
the context of neutral laws of general application is somewhat
muddled, as the description of the cases below will demonstrate.
One of the leading cases in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence,
Braunfeld v. Brown, held Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law to be
constitutionally permissible even though it placed additional
economic burdens on Orthodox Jewish business owners whose
religion required them to close their businesses on Saturdays, as

82

Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 244.
84
Id. at 246.
85
See id. at 251–54.
86
Larson, 456 U.S. at 255.
87
See id.
88
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990), superseded by statute,
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 103-334, § 2, 108 Stat. 3123
(1994).
83
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89

well. These business owners argued that the statute violated the
Free Exercise Clause because they would be forced to incur
significant economic losses while adherents to other faiths, such as
90
Christianity, would be given a considerable advantage. The Court
noted that the Sunday closing law at issue did “not make unlawful any
religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a
secular activity and, as applied to the appellants operates so as to
91
make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive.”
Moreover, the Court stated that legislatures could not possibly be
expected to avoid enacting any “law regulating conduct that may in
some way result in an economic disadvantage to some sects and not
92
to others because of the special practices of the various religions.”
93
As a result, the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law.
Accordingly, it is important to note that laws that do not necessarily
prohibit one from practicing his or her religion will usually be
deemed constitutional.
In another seminal case, Sherbert v. Verner, which seems in direct
conflict with the holding in Braunfeld, the Court held
unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a woman
who was fired from her job for refusing to work on her day of
Sabbath and subsequently refused to take other jobs for substantially
94
the same reason. The Court, in applying a form of strict scrutiny,
95
found that the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Specifically, Justice Brennan put forth a balancing test, stating that
“governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice
96
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.”
The
Court did not expressly overrule Braunfeld, even though the dissent
97
argued that “the decision necessarily overrules Braunfeld v. Brown.”
Justice Brennan sought to distinguish the case from Braunfeld, noting
that the State in that case had “a strong state interest in providing
one uniform day of rest for all workers[,]” and that it would not have
been administratively feasible to exempt those whose faith required
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
Id. at 601–02.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 609.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
See id. at 403–10.
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–

03).
97

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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that Saturday be their day of rest. Justice Brennan seemed to take
issue with the apparent conditioning of employment benefits on
one’s religious beliefs, which he held to “effectively [penalize] the
99
free exercise of [appellant’s] constitutional liberties,” and found
that the State’s interest in this case in preventing fraudulent claims
100
for unemployment benefits was not sufficiently compelling.
Despite Justice Brennan’s attempt to distinguish Braunfeld, however,
the ultimate results in these two cases seem difficult to square. Both
cases concerned a law generally applicable to all citizens that placed
an economic cost on the exercise of one’s religion, yet they reached
diametrically opposite results.
In a third case, the Court extended a religious exemption to
Amish families allowing them to opt out of the state’s compulsory
101
school attendance statute.
In his opinion for the Court, Chief
Justice Burger balanced the religious interests of Amish parents in
removing their children from secular schools against the state’s
interest in ensuring that all students attended school until age
102
sixteen.
Ultimately, he found that the Amish parents’ interests in
directing their children’s religious upbringing outweighed the
interest of the state in requiring these Amish children to attend
103
school for, at most, two additional years.
Chief Justice Burger
seemed to employ a standard of review akin to strict scrutiny, stating
that “when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free
exercise claim . . . more than merely a reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State is required to sustain the
104
validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”
Although the Court acknowledged the state’s strong interest in
providing for compulsory school attendance, the Court stated that
because of the Amish parents’ strong showing of the adverse effect of
the compulsory attendance law on the practice of their religious
beliefs, the burden shifted to the State “to show with more
particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory
education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to
105
the Amish.”
Because the State was unable to do so, the Court
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id. at 408–09.
Id. at 406.
See id. at 409.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See id. at 215–36.
Id. at 234–36.
Id. at 233 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 236.
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exempted the Amish from this generally applicable law, while leaving
106
the law intact. The result in this case seems to be fairly consistent
with that reached in Sherbert and further supports the notion that
under certain circumstances, a religious group may be granted an
exemption from a neutral law of general application upon a strong
showing of the adverse effects of that law on that group’s religious
beliefs.
In a later case, however, the Court declined to extend a religious
107
exemption to an Oregon law prohibiting the ingestion of peyote.
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, the respondents were fired from their jobs for ingesting
peyote, and their unemployment compensation applications were
subsequently denied upon a finding that they were disqualified from
receiving benefits because they were fired for work-related
108
misconduct.
In his opinion, Justice Scalia distinguished this case
from prior cases involving neutral laws of general applicability in
which the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause barred their
application, reasoning that those cases involved not just the Free
Exercise Clause, but the violation of some other constitutional right,
109
Justice Scalia found that “[t]he present case does not
as well.
present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim
110
unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”
Moreover, Justice Scalia declined to extend the analysis in Sherbert to
the situation in Smith because the case involved conduct prohibited
by criminal law, and not merely a dispute over employment
111
compensation.
Justice Scalia concluded his opinion by arguing
against application of the strict scrutiny analysis employed in Sherbert
to cases such as this one, where to do so would potentially invalidate a
wide range of generally applicable laws and enable citizens to avoid
112
criminal laws on the basis of their religious beliefs. Thus, while the
Court seemed to distinguish this case from prior Free Exercise Clause
cases, it would appear that Justice Scalia sought to limit the use of
heightened scrutiny in Free Exercise Clause cases involving neutral
laws of general application.

106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 235–36.
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 874.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 882.
See id. at 882–85.
See id. at 886–90.
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One final case, which may be most pertinent to the following
discussion, involved a challenge by practitioners of the Santeria
religion to city ordinances seeking to prohibit the ritual slaughter of
113
animals—Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.
While the text of these ordinances may have been at least facially
neutral, Justice Kennedy concluded that their actual purpose and
effect was to single out the Santeria religion and suppress its religious
114
practice of ritual slaughter. In light of that finding, Justice Kennedy
proceeded to apply strict scrutiny and found that the law was not
115
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
Importantly, this suggests that virtually any law, no matter how facially
neutral or generally applicable it may appear, will likely be fatally
flawed if there is evidence that its actual purpose was to single out a
particular religious group for disparate treatment.
In sum, while all of the above-mentioned cases involved
seemingly neutral laws of general application, they reached widely
differing results. Based on the reasoning in these cases, it would
appear that the determination of constitutionality is largely
dependent upon the specific facts of each case. This notion will be
important when applying Free Exercise Clause analysis to the
alternative forms of legislation to be suggested in Part V below.
IV. A BACKGROUND ON SHARIA LAW AND THE CONCEPT OF PARALLEL
SHARIA AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
A. A Background on Sharia Law
In its most general sense, Sharia is defined as, “[t]he body of
Islamic religious law applicable to police, banking, business,
116
contracts, and social issues.” At its core, Sharia, which means “path”
in Arabic, seeks first and foremost to govern “daily routines, familial
117
In addition,
and religious obligations, and financial dealings.”
however, Sharia governs a wide variety of other behaviors, such as
“inheritance, marriage and divorce, other moral issues, cleanliness
118
and personal hygiene . . . criminal justice, and war.”
In Islamic
countries, Sharia has moved along two separate tracks: traditional
113
114
115
116
117
118

508 U.S. 520 (1993).
See id. at 533–40.
See id. at 546–47.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY1501 (9th ed. 2011).
Johnson & Vriens, supra note 8.
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 5.
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Sharia and radical Islamist Sharia. Traditional Sharia is the most
practiced form and is generally viewed as a personal guide, “limited
119
to religious observance by Muslims, and elements of family law.”
That is, traditional Sharia generally applies “to the personal practice
of religious observance, family issues, and finance, but not to crime or
120
governance.”
This traditional, or personal, form of Sharia thus mainly
concerns the regulation of only personal behaviors of Muslims and
does not conflict with secular law. For example, personal Sharia
governs the products a Muslim may purchase, the foods a Muslim
may eat, the beverages a Muslim may consume (alcohol is forbidden),
121
and the manner in which a Muslim must pray or dress. In Western
countries, none of these requirements are foisted upon non-Muslims,
and Muslims themselves voluntarily adhere to the guidelines of
Sharia law; as a result, this form of Sharia does not pose any
122
meaningful threat to Western legal systems.
A more hotly contested area of traditional Sharia in which
problems have arisen, however, is in the area of family law,
particularly with respect to the disparate treatment of women in such
123
matters.
Adherents of traditional Sharia generally view matters
related to marriage and sexual relations to be governed by religious
124
In many cases, Muslims “may decline
law and not by secular law.
Western marriage, or be prevented by Western law . . . from turning
125
to Western courts regarding divorce and inheritance.” In addition,
some Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia sanction female genital
mutilation (FGM), “honor” murders, and forced marriage and
126
divorce.
In fact, recent UN estimates show that “thousands of
127
While
women are killed annually in the name of family honor.”
many Muslim societies have rejected FGM, it is still considered

119

Id.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
121
Id. at 7.
122
Id.
123
Johnson & Vriens, supra note 8.
124
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 7.
125
Id. at 7–8.
126
Id. at 8.
127
Johnson & Vriens, supra note 8; Hillary Mayell, Thousands of Women Killed for
GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS
(Feb.
12,
2002),
Family
“Honor”,
NATIONAL
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/02/0212_020212_honorkilling
.html.
120
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128

mandatory in some Muslim cultures. Finally, a well-known example
to those in Western countries is the disparate dress requirements
imposed on Muslim men and women. While both men and women
are expected to be modest, men are not subjected to the same strict
129
body covering requirements to which Muslim women must adhere.
These examples demonstrate only some of the ways in which there is
potential for conflict between Western conceptions of gender
130
equality and Sharia family law.
Generally speaking, although the above discussion demonstrates
some tension between Western ideals and Islamic law, the
relationship between traditional Sharia law and Western law has not
131
historically been adversarial in nature. In fact, Muslim immigrants
in Western countries adhering to traditional Sharia actively partake in
132
Moreover, these
the political process in their new countries.
traditional Sharia adherents widely accept Western law, and
traditional Sharia actually mandates that Muslims accept and abide by
the law of the country in which they reside; if they refuse to do so,
133
they are directed to leave that country for a Muslim one.
Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, traditional Sharia does not apply to nonMuslims; for example, non-Muslims in Western countries are not
required in any way to adhere to the Muslim ban on consumption of
134
alcohol.
This rule of thumb applies in almost every Muslim
135
country, with the exception of Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, any fears
among non-Muslims in Western countries that they might be forced
to submit to the dictates of Sharia law would seem to be largely
unfounded.
The radical Islamist conception of Sharia, however, is the one
128

Johnson & Vriens, supra note 8.
Islamic Dress Code, MASJID AL-MUSLIMIIN, http://www.almasjid.com/content
/islamic_dress_code (last visited April 8, 2013).
130
It should be noted, however, that these examples are not being pointed out to
cast aspersions on Muslims or even to posit that they are common practices in
Muslim societies; rather, they are only mentioned for the purpose of demonstrating
that there do exist Muslim practices that those in Western countries would view as
anathema to their own conceptions of justice and equality.
131
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 9.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 9–10; Saudi Arabia Country Specific Information, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1012.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2013) (“Penalties for the . . . consumption of alcohol . . . in Saudi Arabia are severe.
Convicted offenders can expect long jail sentences, heavy fines, public floggings,
and/or deportation.”).
129
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that generates the greatest fear among non-Muslims that the Western
legal system could one day be overtaken by Sharia principles of law.
For the most part, radical elements of Sharia persist in very few
Islamic countries, and adherents to radical Sharia make up a tiny
136
minority of the minority Muslim populations in Western countries.
As stated previously, however, this Comment seeks to draw out some
of the reasons why States would even consider adopting a law that
137
would prohibit consideration of Sharia in their courts.
Such
legislation ostensibly seeks to attack only the most radical elements of
Sharia; it does not seek to undermine traditional Muslim practices,
138
and indeed that is the view of at least some moderate Muslims.
The radical conception of Sharia “holds that the West is an area
of unbelief and that Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey
139
Western laws but must establish their own Islamic legal standard.”
Adherents of radical Sharia call for far more than simply personal
practice of the Muslim faith; their stated goal is to create Islamic
140
States governed solely by Sharia law. Traditional and radical Sharia
diverge largely in the area of family law, with the most ominous
141
consequences of that divergence falling on women.
While
traditional Sharia certainly contradicts typical Western views with
respect to its treatment of women on certain issues, adherents to
radical Sharia believe that women should be further subordinated in
142
society. Practices in Saudi Arabia serve as the best example of the
operation of radical Sharia; the government in Saudi Arabia believes
“that Shariah forbids women from driving vehicles, appearing in
public without a full and loose body covering, [or] meeting with male
non-relatives in the absence of a family member of the woman as
143
chaperone . . . .” In addition to the poor treatment of women that
radical Sharia adherents advocate, they have also attempted in some
cases to impose the dictates of Sharia on non-Muslims—for example,
136

A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 10.
See supra Part I.
138
Raza, supra note 33 (“The ban on using Sharia law in State courts in the USA
perfectly complies with the constitution because it bans not Islam but the violent
interpretation of Islam.”).
139
Stephen Suleyman Schwartz, Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe,
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
24,
2009,
6:30
AM),
GATESTONE
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/817/shariah-law-and-islamist-ideology-in-western
-europe.
140
Raza, supra note 33.
141
See id.
142
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 10.
143
Id. (emphasis in original)
137
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radical Sharia adherents in a number of communities in Western
countries sought to prohibit non-Muslim neighbors from dealing in
144
Even more
any business having to do with alcohol or pigs.
alarmingly, some in Britain alleged the existence of “no-go zones” for
non-Muslims, in which the communities are essentially closed Muslim
145
societies hostile towards non-Muslims.
Radical Sharia further calls on its adherents to abstain from
Western political processes and states that Western laws against
146
terrorism are not applicable to them.
In addition, radical Sharia
supporters “indoctrinate Muslims in the belief that adherence to
Islamic law exempts immigrant Muslims or their offspring from
obedience to common and criminal law in Western countries,” and
advocate that its adherents are to disregard the social and personal
responsibilities that they may have with non-Muslims and even with
147
moderate Muslims. Radical Sharia adherents also believe that they
are justified in behaving in a variety of manners that would seem
148
repugnant to Western societies. Essentially, radical Sharia espouses
the view that because Sharia law derives from divine sources and
149
secular law does not, “secular law may be ignored or violated.”
Apart from their view on the invalidity of secular law, adherents
to radical Sharia advocate for a number of oppressive policies in the
area of family law. For example, some supporters of radical Sharia
150
apparently support the execution of homosexuals. Adherents also
believe that it is permissible for a husband to beat his wife if the wife
151
becomes rebellious. In addition, the practice of FGM seems to have
broad support among radical Sharia adherents, and they believe that

144

Id. at 10–11.
See Macer Hall, Fury at ‘No-go’ Areas Ruled by the Fanatics, DAILY EXPRESS (Jan. 7,
2008),
http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/30614/Fury-at-No-go-areas-ruled-bythe-fanatics; Jonathan Wynne-Jones, Bishop Warns of No-go Zones for Non-Muslims, THE
TELEGRAPH(Jan. 6, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/new
/uknews/1574694/Bishop-warns-of-no-go-zones-for-non-Muslims.html.
146
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 11.
147
Id.
148
Id. (“Followers of radical Shariah also claim justification to physically degrade
women, children, and employees, borrow money from non-Muslims without repaying
it, contract student loans and default on them, rent property without fulfilling lease
and other responsibilities, commit identity fraud and otherwise steal property, and
generally defy the law followed by their neighbours, down to such simple matters as
traffic offences.”).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 12.
151
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 12.
145
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the cutting of the woman’s clitoris actually promotes her health.
Also prevalent in radical Sharia is the concept of punishment for
“crimes” completely disproportionate to the conduct at issue. In
Saudi Arabia, for example, a person found guilty of adultery is subject
153
to as many as 100 lashes.
A person caught drinking alcohol earns
anywhere from forty to eighty lashes, and in one horrifying case, a
Saudi man was given 4,750 lashes for having sex with his sister-in154
law.
Even more examples of excessive punishment for “morals
offenses” abound, but just these few examples illustrate the extreme
views of society embraced by radical Sharia adherents. Adherents to
traditional Sharia have expressed concern that adherents to radical
Sharia seek to impose this strict form of law in all Muslim countries
155
and even in Muslim communities within Western societies.
Thus, Muslim thinking is somewhat bifurcated with respect to
the nature of Sharia to which Muslims should adhere. While the
large majority of Muslims support the traditional, or personal,
conception of Sharia, radical Sharia adherents still seem to pervade
the landscape, and their prominence in media reporting gives the
public the impression that their numbers and influence on Muslim
156
discourse are greater than they are in reality. It is perhaps for this
reason that many “Islamophobes” accord the imposition of Sharia law
in Western countries the status of a clear and present danger, even
though most empirical data would suggest the threat to be far less
157
grave and far more remote in reality. In addition, the diametrically
opposing views of traditional and radical Sharia adherents may have
152

Id.
Dr. Ahmad Shafaat, Punishment for Adultery in Islam: A Detailed Examination,
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES, http://www.islamicperspectives.com/stoning1.htm (last visited
Apr. 16, 2013).
154
Saqr al-Amry, 4,750 Lashes, Six-Year Jail for Adultery, ARAB NEWS (Feb. 18, 2002,
12:00 AM), http://english.arabnews.com/node/218604.
155
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 15.
156
See, e.g., Andrew Gilligan, Islamic Extremism: So Did We Cure the Problem?, THE
TELEGRAPH
(Apr.
26,
2011,
8:34
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8475290
/Islamist-extremism-so-did-we-cure-the-problem.html; Melanie Phillips, Londonistan:
Radical Islam and the Disintegration of British Society, MIDDLE EAST FORUM (May 17,
2006),
http://www.meforum.org/994/londonistan-radical-islam-and-thedisintegration.
157
See, e.g., British Muslims Poll: Key Points, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2007, 1:04 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6309983.stm. For example, on the whole, 59% of
British Muslims prefer British law to Sharia law versus only 28% who prefer Sharia.
For the 16–24 year-old cohort, however, support for the imposition of Sharia rises to
37% versus 17% support from British Muslims age fifty-five and over. Id.
153
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led to the creation of a “middle way” that is the topic of the next
section: parallel Sharia.
B. History and Background on Parallel Sharia
Parallel Sharia strikes a balance between traditional Sharia and
158
radical Sharia that was developed in Europe in the 20th century.
Parallel Sharia departs from traditional Sharia in that it advocates a
separate legal system that Western governments would be charged
159
with enforcing.
It differs from the radical conception of Sharia
because “it is limited to personal and family law as well as,
160
increasingly, financial transactions.”
While some have
characterized the concept of parallel Sharia as a compromise
between Muslim minorities and Western governments, many nonMuslim commentators view it as merely a Trojan horse for the
161
introduction of radical Sharia in their countries. At first glance, the
concept of parallel Sharia seems quite benign; it simply asks that
Muslims be permitted to live under the laws of their religion and
requests enforcement assistance from the Western government. But
upon further inspection, the concept is rife with radical tinges
because it advocates a separatist view of society in which a small
minority lives under one set of rules while all others live under a
162
different set of rules.
Moreover, the concept of parallel Sharia
opens the door for radicalization, “since, in a Muslim-only legal
structure, Muslim representatives of varying orientations could gain
163
authority.”
While parallel Sharia poses as moderation between traditional
and radical Sharia, the concept has actually been most strongly
advanced in radical circles, with a great deal of scholarly contribution
164
to the area originating in the United States.
Euphemistically
termed “fiqh for minorities”—that is, Islamic legal interpretation for
minorities—the concept of parallel Sharia is grounded in a false view
165
of the history of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands. Taha Jabir Al158

A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 15.
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 16.
162
Id.
163
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 16.
164
Id.; See, e.g., TAHA JABIR AL-ALWANI, TOWARDS A FIQH FOR MINORITIES: SOME
BASIC REFLECTIONS (2003).
165
AL-ALWANI, supra note 164, at xi–xiii; A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at
17.
159

ROSATO (DO NOT DELETE)

682

4/2/2014 12:23 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:659

Alwani, an Iraqi-born cleric formerly residing in the United States
and a leading proponent of parallel Sharia, claimed that Muslims
dominated the world in antiquity and affluent Muslims traveling to
non-Muslim lands would regularly set up mini-societies over which
Muslim law had complete dominion, without any interference from
166
This view of history is not grounded in any
Western authorities.
reality, but it appears to reinforce the view that Muslims living in nonMuslim lands should not be obligated to follow the dictates of secular
167
law.
Certainly, the concept of parallel Sharia could merely be
accepted as a theory of reasonable accommodation of religion, and as
such, would be perfectly acceptable in countries such as the United
168
States under current constitutional jurisprudence.
This notion,
however, proves too simplistic.
The concept of reasonable
accommodation has never incorporated the idea that an entire
religious minority should be outside the purview of all secular law;
rather, it merely posits that in certain circumstances, the law may
bend, but not break, to a reasonable extent to accommodate one’s
169
religious preferences.
Indeed, the idea of reasonable
accommodation can be seen in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,
discussed supra, in which the Supreme Court granted a narrow
exemption to Amish schoolchildren by allowing them to forgo two
170
extra years of mandatory schooling.
Conversely, the Supreme
Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith could be viewed as a
judgment that permitting exemption from a generally applicable
drug law solely because of religious beliefs would be an unreasonable
171
religious accommodation.
Parallel Sharia goes far beyond a
reasonable accommodation of religion because it advocates a
separatist viewpoint and would lead to further fracturing of the legal
172
and social ties that bind all members of a given society together.
Nonetheless, advocates of parallel Sharia continue to espouse
the view that Western acceptance of the idea would actually serve the
twin goals of unity among the Muslim population and comity
173
between Muslims and non-Muslims.
It seems plain, however, that
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

AL-ALWANI, supra note 164, at xi.
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 17.
Id.
See generally Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 17.
Id. at 18.
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permitting one minority population to live under its own set of rules
would have one of two effects: feelings of resentment and
suspiciousness
between
Muslims
and
non-Muslims,
and
incredulousness and disillusionment with the government for
permitting such a dual legal system to operate in a country that
seemingly respected the rule of law. As stated previously, an
important aspect of the concept of parallel Sharia is the idea that
174
Western governments would be charged with its enforcement. If a
Western government such as the United States were indeed to
formally adopt such a system, it would seem difficult to argue that the
system does not violate the precept of separation of church and state
that most view as a fundamental requirement of modern democratic
societies.
V. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE “SAVE OUR
STATE” AMENDMENT
The concept of “Our Federalism” has been an important one
since the founding of this country. Put simply, “Our Federalism” is
the “recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a
Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief
that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
175
separate ways.” The Founding Fathers were sensitive to the notion
that State governments should be free to carry out their legitimate
functions without undue interference from the federal government,
and this notion still “occupies a highly important place in our
176
Nation’s history and its future.” The concept of “Our Federalism” is
perhaps most definitively embodied in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
177
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
Thus,
while the Constitution prescribes the outer bounds of the function of
the federal government, it leaves to the States any powers not
specifically delegated to the federal government.
Among the powers left to the states is the power to shape their
respective judiciaries. Indeed, the broad power of the states to
establish the nature, function, and rules of their courts has long been
174
175
176
177

Id. at 21.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
Id. at 44–45.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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178

recognized. While Article III of the United States Constitution and
Marbury v. Madison place constraints on the ability of the Congress to
shape the judiciary and its rules of decision (since the judiciary, and
179
in particular the Supreme Court, is the final expositor of the law),
no such constraints exist at the State level except for those imposed
by State constitutions or statutes. States are free to direct the rules of
decision of their courts without federal interference, whether
through legislation (to the extent possible under the State
constitution), judicial action, or through the State constitutional
180
amendment process.
It is against this backdrop of federalism that this Comment offers
potential alternatives to the “Save Our State” Amendment. At their
core, state constitutional amendments or statutes like the “Save Our
State” Amendment are merely rules of judicial procedure because
they seek to provide the state courts with guidance as to the law on
181
which decisions should be based. As such, the states should be free
to amend their state constitutions or enact legislation to force their
judiciaries to adhere to particular rules of decision, so long as those
amendments or statutes comport with the principles embodied in,
182
and the individual rights secured by, the federal Constitution.
While it may be the case that the “Save Our State” Amendment was
fatally flawed in its blatant discrimination, there is no reason why
similar state constitutional amendments or statutes seeking to achieve
the same goal of separation of church and state could not pass
muster under First Amendment analysis.

178

Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1879) (“It is the right of every State to
establish such courts as it sees fit, and to prescribe their several jurisdictions as to
territorial extent, subject-matter, and amount, and the finality and effect of their
decisions . . . .”).
179
See U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
180
See Erie. R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938) (“Supervision over
either the legislative or judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except as
to matters by the constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United
States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the
authority of the state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.” (quoting
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting))).
181
See H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (requiring, among
other things, Oklahoma courts to base decisions on federal and state law and
regulations).
182
See Lewis, 101 U.S. at 30.
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A. The First Alternative to the “Save Our State” Amendment: An
Amendment or Statute That Avoids Mention of Religion Entirely
In searching for constitutionally permissible alternatives to the
“Save Our State” Amendment, the most obvious starting point would
be a state constitutional amendment or statute that avoids the
discriminatory singling out of a particular religion that proved to be
the fatal flaw in the “Save Our State” Amendment under the Supreme
183
Court’s Larson Test.
That is, this type of state constitutional
amendment would essentially mirror the “Save Our State”
Amendment, with the references to Sharia stricken. Recall the
language of the “Save Our State” Amendment:
The Courts . . . shall uphold and adhere to the law as
provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law,
the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated thereto, and
if necessary the law of another state of the United States
provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in
making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the
legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the
courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before
the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of
184
first impression.
Thus, the type of state constitutional amendment proposed here
would simply strike the italicized language above. Arizona passed a
statute in 2011 with language similar to that proposed in this
alternative in that it simply prohibited enforcement of foreign laws
conflicting with the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
185
States or with the constitution and laws of Arizona. As of the time
of this writing, Arizona’s law is the only one with a similar aim as that
of the “Save Our State” Amendment to achieve passage, and it has yet
186
to be challenged in court as unconstitutional.
In light of those
facts, the Arizona law would be a strong model for the drafting of a
statute that enshrines the supremacy of domestic law while avoiding
183

See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (holding that laws
discriminating among religion will be analyzed under the rubric of strict scrutiny);
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129–31 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that the “Save Our
State” Amendment failed to satisfy Larson’s strict scrutiny test).
184
H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (emphasis added).
185
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3101 to -3103 (2012).
186
Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 1, at 371.

ROSATO (DO NOT DELETE)

686

4/2/2014 12:23 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:659

the unconstitutionally discriminatory pitfalls of the “Save Our State”
Amendment. In assessing the effectiveness and constitutionality of a
statute like Arizona’s, the questions to be decided will be twofold:
first, whether the resulting language would achieve the goals of strict
adherence to federal and state law and separation of church and state
that the original amendment sought; and second, whether the
resulting language would raise any other constitutional problems.
As to the first question, while the amendment would clearly not
have the same explicit effect as intended under the original, this
revised amendment would certainly still enshrine the concept of the
supremacy of state and federal law in state courthouses. How
necessary such an amendment would be in light of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution and the plenary police
powers of the state under the Tenth Amendment is not a question
that need be decided here; it is sufficient to state that there is no
constitutional bar to codification of common law principles, and in
fact, state legislatures across the country routinely engage in the
187
practice of codification of judge-made law.
It must be noted,
however, that while a law like Arizona’s would certainly avoid the
problem of discrimination seen in the “Save Our State” Amendment,
avoidance of that problem would come at the expense of the goal of
explicitly codifying a ban on consideration of religious doctrine in
188
judicial decision-making.
The more difficult question would be whether a constitutionally
impermissible purpose in the context of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment could still be gleaned from a statute similar to
Arizona’s, even though the statute contains no explicit mention of
religion. The relevant language of the Arizona statute defines
foreign law as “any law, rule or legal code or system other than the

187

See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (2012) (reception statute for English
common law); Moses v. Commonwealth, 611 S.E.2d 607, 613 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding state statute to be a codification of the common law); Putrino v. Buffalo
Athletic Club, 624 N.E.2d 676, 677 (N.Y. 1993) (finding the imposition of liability to
be a codification of the common law).
188
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has already declared that
secular courts are prohibited from interpreting religious doctrine. See United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Accordingly, it might be argued that this so-called
“religious question doctrine” in fact obviates the need for explicit codification of a
ban on consideration of religious doctrine in judicial decision-making. This
Comment does not seek to pass judgment on the possible redundancy of such
legislation in light of the “religious question doctrine.” Rather, this Comment simply
examines the constitutionality of such amendments, regardless of their ultimate
necessity.
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constitution, laws and ratified treaties of the United States and the
territories of the United States, or the constitution and laws of this
189
Thus, the word “religion” appears nowhere in the statute;
State.”
broadly interpreted, however, the “any law, rule or legal code or
system” language could be construed to include religious doctrine.
Of course, religious doctrines could be considered “systems” and
religion does play an important part in a variety of legal systems
across the globe, but it would be a tremendous leap to say that
because the amendment mentions the word “system,” it automatically
has some discriminatory purpose against organized religion.
Interpreted in a way that avoids the implication of religion, this
language could mean merely that a state court is prohibited from
using, as principal justification for its decision in a given case, law
deriving from another country or culture. That is, the statute
ostensibly permits consideration of laws deriving from another
country or culture as persuasive, so long as those laws do not control
the decision of the court. Assuming for the sake of argument,
however, that the language of the statute does imply a ban on
consideration of religious doctrine, analysis under the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment becomes
appropriate.
As an initial matter, it seems clear that the Larson Test would not
apply in this context because we are not “presented with a state law
190
granting a denominational preference;” indeed, the plain language
of the proposed statute never mentions religion and thus could not
possibly be construed to single out any specific religion. Therefore,
the more appropriate test under the Establishment Clause for the
purposes of the proposed statute would be the three-pronged Lemon
Test, which requires that (1) the statute have a “secular legislative
191
purpose;” (2) the statute’s “principal or primary effect . . . neither
192
advances nor inhibits religion;” and (3) “the statute [does] not
193
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”
The proposed statute would meet the first prong of the test
because its secular purpose ostensibly would be to protect citizens of
a given state from the application of laws inconsistent with federal or
state law. As a point of reference, the Arizona legislature itself
189
190
191
192
193

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2012).
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
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declared that its intent in passing its statute was “to protect its citizens
from the application of foreign laws when the application of a foreign
law will result in the violation of a right guaranteed by the
constitution of this state or of the United States or conflict with the
194
laws of this State.” As to the second prong, the statute’s principal or
primary effect would simply be to force state judges to base their
decisions on federal or state law and preclude application of foreign
laws. Any effect that the law might have on religion could hardly be
considered primary or principal. Thus, the proposed statute would
pass the second prong of the test. Finally, the proposed statute would
meet the third prong of the test because it would not require
constant policing of interactions between the state judiciary and
religion. Most of the policing and oversight of the state judiciary
would be with respect to its general use of foreign law in its decision,
with cases involving religious doctrine possibly comprising a small
subset of cases within that larger class. Therefore, because the
proposed statute would contravene neither the Larson Test nor the
Lemon Test, the statute would likely be constitutional under
Establishment Clause analysis.
In analyzing the proposed statute in the context of the Free
Exercise Clause, probably the most appropriate point of departure
for the analysis is the case of Braunfeld v. Brown, in which the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s
generally applicable Sunday closing law even though it placed
business owners observing a Saturday Sabbath at a decided
195
disadvantage in relation to Sunday Sabbath observers. The aim of
the statute proposed here is generally to ensure that state court
judges do not base their decisions on foreign law that is inconsistent
with state or federal law. As such, the statute at most “imposes only
196
an indirect burden on the exercise of religion” and does not
specifically outlaw any religious practice. Moreover, the proposed
statute is only meant to apply to the state judiciary (a branch of
government) and not to citizens generally, so it is difficult to see how
the government could impose any substantial indirect burden on the
citizenry’s ability to live their lives in accordance with their respective
faiths. Of course, the statute would indirectly affect citizens, since the
cases that they bring in state court must necessarily be adjudicated in
194

H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/laws/0076.pdf.
195
See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
196
Id. at 606.

2011),

available

at
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accordance with the statute, thus leaving open the possibility that
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause are implicated in a given
case involving religion. That problem would be ameliorated,
however, by the proposed statute’s requirement that state judges’
decisions be made in accordance with the United States Constitution.
That language would presumably be meant to include not just the
text of the Constitution itself, but also the meaning of the
Constitution as determined by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the
proposed statute would not appear to endanger the citizens’ free
exercise rights, and the statute would consequently pass
constitutional muster under Free Exercise Clause analysis as a neutral
law of general applicability.
B. Another Alternative: Broad Banning of Consideration of Religious
Law as Controlling Authority in a Given Case
A second type of state constitutional amendment or statute
would be one that broadly bans consideration of any religious
doctrine or international law, but with more precise and narrow
language than the “Save Our State” Amendment’s command that
state courts “shall not consider international law or Sharia law.” That
is, the amendment or statute could broadly ban state judges from
relying chiefly upon foreign or religious law as a basis for their
decisions. Again, a proposed (but not passed) Arizona statute
197
provides a strong model for this type of legislation. The proposed
Arizona bill, known as the “Arizona Foreign Decisions Act,” begins by
forbidding the Arizona courts from incorporating “any body of
religious sectarian law into any decision, finding or opinion as
198
controlling or influential authority.”
The bill goes on to define
religious sectarian law as “any statute, tenet or body of law evolving
within and binding a specific religious sect or tribe,” including
199
“Sharia law, Canon law, Halacha and Karma.”
Thus, the proposed statute avoids the discriminatory pitfalls of
the “Save Our State” Amendment by providing for a blanket ban of
consideration of any religious law in state court; the fact that the
statute specifically mentions as examples all of the most prominent
religious doctrines implies the statute’s intention to ban
consideration of any religious law. Moreover, the reach of the law is
197

See Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 1, at 373–74.
H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/hb2582p.pdf.
199
Id.
198

2011),

available

at
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narrowed in that it limits the ban only to situations in which the
reasoning in a court’s decision relies primarily upon religious law. As
such, this type of statute would ostensibly avoid the potential injury
raised by Mr. Awad in Awad v. Ziriax, in which he claimed that the
“Save Our State” Amendment would prohibit a court from properly
200
probating his will. Because probate of one’s will in accordance with
that individual’s wishes would not be chiefly reliant upon religious
law (one’s religious beliefs might underlie the directions contained
within the will, but that would not be an issue for the court to
decide), but rather upon state probate statutes, such a judicial
proceeding would not be likely to fall within the ambit of the
proposed statute. This proposed statute seemingly provides a more
robust alternative to the first statute proposed in terms of its explicit
language regarding religion, but the question becomes whether this
explicit ban runs afoul of the Religion Clauses.
As with the first proposed statute, Establishment Clause analysis
under the Larson Test would seem to be inapposite here, since the
proposed statute does not single out any one religion for disparate
treatment, but rather treats all religions in the exact same manner.
Thus, analysis under the Lemon Test will be more appropriate in this
201
case. As to the first prong of the Test, the purpose of the proposed
statute is certainly secular in nature, since the chief aim of the
proposed statute is to ensure that religious law does not infect the
state courts. That is, the statute’s goal is to affirm and enshrine the
separation of church and state. With respect to the second prong,
the question is whether the proposed statute would have the
principal or primary effect of inhibiting religion. Given that courts
202
are already generally forbidden to interpret religious law, it is
difficult to see how a statute that simply reinforces that notion by
forbidding the use of religious law as controlling authority for a
judicial decision would inhibit religion in any way. Religious practice
would not be inhibited simply because courts are forbidden from
entertaining arguments emanating out of a religious doctrine, and in
fact a law such as the one proposed would have the effect of leveling
the playing field for all religions by ensuring that judicial decisions
203
will not favor one religion over another. Thus, the proposed statute
200

Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1120 (10th Cir. 2012).
See supra Part III.A.
202
See supra note 188.
203
See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]n order to give effect to the First Amendment’s
201

ROSATO (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/2/2014 12:23 PM

COMMENT

691

meets the second prong of the Lemon Test. Finally, the third prong
of the Lemon Test requiring that the statute not cause excessive
204
entanglement between government and religion presents a closer
question. The proposed statute, however, is distinguishable from a
statute involving, for example, interaction between government and
religious organizations because this statute merely amounts to a state
court procedural rule and thus will not require any monitoring of
interactions between any apparatus of the government and religious
institutions. Rather, the statute would simply require monitoring of
the behavior of state judges to ensure that they are not injecting
religious law into their decisions. While one could argue that this
monitoring could amount to an entanglement between government
and religion in the abstract, it could hardly be said to be a concrete
entanglement of religious and governmental interests. For that
reason, the proposed statute should satisfy the third prong of the
Lemon Test.
Analysis under the Free Exercise Clause might raise
constitutional difficulties in the context of this statute, since it does
not neatly fit into the category of a neutral law of general application.
In one sense, the proposed law is not neutral because it explicitly
discusses religion. Thus, as between religion and irreligion, the law is
not neutral. In another sense, however, the law is arguably neutral
because it treats all religions in the same manner. Neutrality,
therefore, is in the eye of the beholder. Accepting for the sake of
argument that the law is, in fact, neutral, the most appropriate
Supreme Court case on which to base analysis of the proposed statute
under the Free Exercise Clause would likely be Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, in which the Supreme Court held a
seemingly neutral statute to be unconstitutional because it prohibited
a practice of ritual slaughter that could be traced to a specific
205
religion. The question, then, is whether the proposed statute could
be construed as having an underlying discriminatory purpose that its
purpose of requiring on the part of all organs of government a strict neutrality
toward theological questions, courts should not undertake to decide such
questions.”).
204
See supra Part III.A.
205
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993). One could argue that this case might also be applicable in the context of the
first proposed alternative, but because it was a strain to find any religious motivation
underlying that statute, application of Lukumi was strategically left for the second
alternative. Indeed, application of that case seems particularly appropriate where a
law mentions all of the major world religions, but may, in fact, be targeting only one.
That situation simply seems to more closely track the one faced in Lukumi.
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plain language does not reveal. As an initial matter, the proposed
statute here is distinguishable from the statute at issue in Lukumi
because while that statute sought to outlaw a specific practice of
private citizens, this proposed statute simply seeks to regulate the
conduct of the state judiciary in issuing decisions. Therefore, there is
no pattern of conduct attributable to a specific religious group that
could be identified here; rather, the proposed statute functions more
as a prophylactic measure to prevent judges from injecting religious
doctrine into their opinions. Moreover, in order to show an
underlying discriminatory purpose against a certain religion, one
would have to demonstrate that this statute is attacking known
conduct of a particular religious group, and one would be hardpressed to find evidence of this kind. The legislative findings
appended to the proposed Arizona bill provide significant insight
into the thinking of state legislators in possibly passing such a statute;
those findings are replete with references to the First, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments, along with several other provisions of the
206
federal Constitution.
Based on the legislative findings, it would
seem that the overall purpose of the law would be to prevent the
establishment of law on the basis of religious sectarian law, with no
particular view towards outlawing the practice of any specific religion.
Indeed, the plain language of the statute specifically identifies and
outlaws judicial reliance on the laws of any of the major world
religions while ensuring that the list of examples provided is not
207
exhaustive. For all of these reasons, the proposed statute would not
be violative of the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore the law would
likely be deemed constitutional in the context of the First
Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the concept of parallel Sharia has gained steam
in Western countries as the voices of more radical Sharia adherents
have grown louder. While these views in no way represent the views
of the majority of Muslims living in Western countries, they are views
that have the support of more than just a few on the margins. In
light of this, several states, including Oklahoma, have attempted
through legislation to prevent ideas such as parallel Sharia from
206

See H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/
hb2582p.pdf.
207
See id.
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gaining a foothold in their governments and thereby undermining
the time-honored concept of separation of church and state. While
an initiative like the “Save Our State” Amendment offends both
constitutional principles and general notions of fairness and justice,
there should be no reason why states cannot take other steps to
ensure that their judges apply only secular, domestic law. The
Supreme Court has long recognized the states’ broad power to
develop their respective judiciaries, and if state legislatures view it of
sufficient importance to pass laws enshrining the supremacy of
federal and state law in judicial decisions, then they should be
permitted to do so. As this Comment demonstrates, states have
alternatives to the “Save Our State” Amendment that do not suffer
from the same unconstitutionally discriminatory infirmity and
achieve essentially the same goal. This issue is certainly a thorny one
and the debate will continue to rage on as to whether laws similar to
the “Save Our State” Amendment are even necessary or advisable, but
the states’ power to pass non-discriminatory laws that seek to keep
religion out of their courts should not be up for debate.

